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Abstract The European market abuse rules require issuers to disclose inside
information which directly concerns them (‘price-sensitive information’) as soon as
possible. Delaying disclosure is possible under strict conditions, one of them being
that confidentiality of the information is ensured. This paper analyses the question
of whether the duty to disclose can be re-activated in case of considerable fluctu-
ations in the price or volume of the traded securities, as confidentiality may no
longer be ensured. In the Dutch VEB/SdB case, the Court of Appeal decided that an
issuer did not timely disclose, considering the market developments, which con-
stituted a tort towards investors. The paper analyses this case, the questions it raises,
and its relevance for European jurisdictions. The implication of VEB/SdB is that
issuers would be wise to carefully monitor the development of prices and volumes
when they delay disclosure of inside information which directly concerns them, as
failure to disclosure could result in civil liability or penalties.
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1 Introduction
European law contains several obligations for companies to inform investors if the
companies’ securities are to be publicly traded.1 There is an initial obligation to
publish a prospectus when securities are offered to the public or admitted to
trading,2 and there are continuing obligations when securities are subsequently
being traded. These continuing obligations can be distinguished in periodic
disclosure obligations (e.g., half-yearly and yearly financial reports)3 and ad hoc
obligations to disclose certain inside information (also called episodic/ad hoc
reporting requirements, or current reports). This article focuses on the latter
obligation, which as of 3 July 2016 is based on the new Market Abuse Regulation
(MAR) and Market Abuse Directive (MAD).4 Before, it was based on the MAD of
2003.5 According to the MAR, there is an obligation for an issuer to ‘inform the
public as soon as possible of inside information which directly concerns that
issuer’.6 Inside information is defined as
‘information of a precise nature, which has not been made public, relating,
directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers or to one or more financial
instruments, and which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a
significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or on the price of
related derivative financial instruments.’7
Delaying the disclosure of such price-sensitive information (in the paper this term
is used as a shorthand for inside information which directly concerns the issuer) is
possible, but only under strict conditions. These are: (1) the delay serves a
legitimate interest of the issuer; (2) the delay would not be likely to mislead the
public; and (3) the issuer is able to ensure the confidentiality of such information.8
Compared to the MAD of 2003, the MAR has added new rules. In case of a delay,
issuers need to inform the supervisory authority of the delay and provide a written
1 ‘Publicly traded’ here refers to securities being traded on a regulated market, or if the European
disclosure rules so require, on a multilateral trading facility or organised trading facility.
2 See Council Directive 2003/71/EC of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when
securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading, OJ 2003 L345/64 (hereafter: the Prospectus
Directive). This Directive was later amended by Council Directives 2008/11/EC, 2010/73/EU, 2010/78/
EU, 2013/50/EU and 2014/51/EU.
3 See Council Directive 2004/109/EC of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency
requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a
regulated market, OJ 2004 L390/38.
4 Art. 17 of Council Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (Market Abuse
Regulation—MAR), OJ 2014 L173/1. See also new Council Directive 2014/57/EU of 16 April 2014 on
criminal sanctions for market abuse (Market Abuse Directive—MAD), OJ 2014 L173/179.
5 Art. 6 of Council Directive 2003/6/EC (later amended by Directives 2008/26/EC and 2010/78/EU) of
28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), OJ 2003 L96/16.
6 Art. 17(1) MAR. See also Art. 6(1) MAD for the situation before 3 July 2016.
7 Art. 7(1) MAR. See also Art. 1 MAD for the situation before 3 July 2016.
8 See Art. 17(4) MAR, and Art. 6(2) MAD 2003 for the situation before 3 July 2016. Although there is a
small difference in the wording of the MAR and the MAD 2003 on this point, this does not seem to have
implications.
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explanation that the requirements for delay were met. This needs to be done
immediately after disclosure, or, alternatively, Member States may require that a
record of such explanation is only to be provided to the supervisory authority upon
request.9 Furthermore, requirements for credit institutions and financial institutions
were added, with a view to the stability of the financial system.10 Moreover, the
MAR has added a provision regarding the confidentiality of the inside information.
As soon as confidentiality is no longer ensured, issuers should disclose as soon as
possible. This includes situations where a rumour explicitly relates to the inside
information and is sufficiently accurate to indicate that the confidentiality of that
information is no longer ensured.11 Unfortunately, the obligation to disclose price-
sensitive information raises various questions, as the MAR and MAD do not always
provide (sufficiently) clear definitions and concepts.12
In this article, I focus on the case where an issuer delays the disclosure of price-
sensitive information but there are questions as to whether the confidentiality of the
information is still ensured due to considerable fluctuations in price or volume of the
issuer’s traded securities. Such a case occurred in the Netherlands, where the Dutch
investor association VEB accused a (formerly listed) company of violating its
disclosure duties, and, in a civil liability lawsuit, successfully obtained a court
declaration that the company’s behaviour constituted a tort towards investors.13 This
example is relevant not only for the Netherlands, but for all European jurisdictions
where criminal or administrative penalties can be imposed or private enforcement
by investors is possible. The question is how to establish whether confidentiality is
still ensured when there are considerable fluctuations in volumes and/or prices.
To answer this question, I first present the Dutch VEB/SdB case. Next, I discuss
the relevant criterion to establish whether confidentiality is still ensured. I then
proceed with a discussion of different methodologies that can be used to establish a
breach of confidentiality. The article concludes with an assessment of the
implications of the analysis for European jurisdictions.
2 The VEB/SdB Case
Super de Boer (SdB) was a Dutch supermarket chain with shares listed on Euronext
Amsterdam. On 4 September 2009, SdB was informed that competitor Jumbo
wanted to make a bid for all its assets and liabilities. After 4 September 2009,
negotiations were held between SdB and Jumbo about the proposed ‘takeover’. At
that point, SdB did not inform investors but kept the negotiations silent. About
9 Art. 17(4) MAR.
10 Art. 17(5–6) MAR.
11 Art. 17(7) MAR.
12 For an extensive analysis, see Hoff (2011).
13 Hof Amsterdam 10 July 2012, JOR 2015/70; Hof Amsterdam 16 April 2013, ECLI:NL:-
GHARL:2013:2660; Hof Amsterdam 11 November 2014, JOR 2015/71. Later, a settlement was
achieved. In the background, the author advised the VEB in the capacity of expert. No personal financial
gain was involved.
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2 weeks later, on 17 September, SdB received a phone call from a newspaper that
seemed to be well informed about the pending deal. SdB suspected that the takeover
plans were no longer confidential and issued a press release on 18 September,
announcing the takeover plans. However, the Dutch investor association VEB
questioned whether delaying disclosure until 18 September had been lawful,
considering the significant fluctuations in volumes and prices of the shares before 18
September. Hence, it filed a lawsuit for damages against Super de Boer.
The development of the share price and the number of transactions was as
follows (see Table 1)
During the proceedings, the VEB showed how the share price and volume had
developed historically in a two-year period before September 2009.
Until July 2008, the number of transactions fluctuated significantly from less than
100,000 to a multitude of 100,000. Volumes of between 500,000 and 1,000,000
were not uncommon, with some volumes above 1,000,000. However, from August
2008 onwards, such high numbers no longer occurred and large differences between
trading days were no longer observed. On only 7 dates did the number of
transactions exceed 200,000. The share price fluctuated during the two-year period.
From August 2008, the price decreased irregularly from €3.72 to €1.942 and then
increased to €3.091, to vary later between €2.75 and €3.08. In the period
immediately preceding 4 September 2009, the share price fluctuated between €2.80
and €2.85.
Looking at the Table and the historical data, it can be observed that especially on
9 and 10 September 2009 considerably more shares were being traded than in the
period before. Until 10 September, the share price had been more or less constant
but then increased after that, first by 1% but later by several percentage points a day.
Now the question is whether these developments can be said to have triggered a
duty for Super de Boer to report the price-sensitive information on the takeover
before 18 September, the date on which the company actually issued a press release.
Both the Dutch District Court and the Court of Appeal answered this question
affirmatively, although they differed somewhat in their reasoning as well as in their
opinion regarding the precise date on which the information should have been
disclosed. The decision of the Court of Appeal is final and no longer open to appeal.
Below, I discuss both decisions and add my own analysis.
3 The Criterion for Deciding When Confidentiality Is (Apparently) No
Longer Ensured and Price-Sensitive Information Needs to Be
Disclosed
Under Dutch law, to be able to ensure confidentiality, the issuer checks the access to
the information and takes appropriate measures so that this access is restricted to
persons who need to be familiar with the information for the normal course of their
work, profession or function.14 Even if the issuer meets these requirements, there
could still be instances where confidentiality of the price-sensitive information is
14 Art. 4(2) Besluit transparantie uitgevende instellingen Wft.
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apparently no longer ensured. In that case, the obligation to disclose the information
as soon as possible is re-activated. The Court of Appeal argues that confidentiality
need not actually or certainly have been breached before the disclosure duty can be
re-activated. Clear signals that confidentiality is no longer ensured will suffice.
Market developments such as fluctuations in prices or volumes, possibly in
combination with other factors, could constitute such a signal. According to the
Court of Appeal, the issuer generally does not have to react to speculation or
unfounded rumours in the market. However, delaying disclosure of price-sensitive
information can no longer be justified
‘if there are developments in the market that deviate significantly from usual
patterns, without there being an alternative (convincing) explanation.’15
Arguably, this is a reasonable criterion. It should be acknowledged that there may
be a leakage, despite the issuer’s best efforts to keep the price-sensitive information
confidential. This leakage could show itself in trading patterns. Even though the
issuer is allowed to delay disclosure of the price-sensitive information if this serves
a legitimate interest, this is no longer the case if it is clear that confidentiality is
compromised. A difficulty with the criterion is the precise meaning of the word
‘significantly’. Below, I analyse methodologies that could be used to determine
whether a deviation is ‘significant’.
The Court of Appeal’s criterion rightly allows for alternative (convincing)
explanations for the unusual patterns. The burden of proof regarding alternative
explanations should be on the issuer that decided to delay disclosure. What kind of
alternative explanations are conceivable? In the VEB/SdB case, the issuer SdB
provided several alternative explanations, but failed to convince the Court that these
could account for the anomalous trading patterns. I return to this subject below
(Sect. 5).
Table 1 Development of share price and volume
Date (Sept. 2009) Share price end of day in € Increase/decrease Volume
4 2.82 0.53% 41,234
7 2.828 0.28% 198,778
8 2.829 0.04% 126,887
9 2.828 (0.04%) 607,200
10 2.859 1.10% 865,239
11 3.0 4.93% 426,245
14 3.137 4.57% 318,255
15 3.235 3.12% 611,928
16 3.395 4.95% 310,635
17 3.491 2.83% 306,256
18 4.07 9,081,166
15 Hof Amsterdam 10 July 2012, JOR 2015/70 [4.12].
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4 Methodology to Determine ‘Significant Deviation from Usual
Patterns’
4.1 Introduction
The Court of Appeal decided to consult experts on the implementation of its
criterion. Two experts were appointed, a finance professor and an investment
analyst/former banker, to reflect both science and practice in the expert opinions. In
an interlocutory judgment, the Court phrased a number of questions for them:16
1. Was the development of volumes and prices in the relevant period significant in
itself and from a historical perspective? How is significance determined? Is it
necessary to correct for external factors such as the development of the general
index, and if so, how?
2. Are there any other factors that provide a convincing explanation for the
developments?17
3. What does a ‘leakage’ typically look like?
4. What period needs to be used to compare the developments in September 2009
with the past?
5. Are only positive price differences relevant, or do negative price developments
also have to be taken into account?
6. Should the issuer have recognised that there were significant and unexplainable
developments in prices and volumes in the relevant period? If so, from what date?
7. Are there any other relevant aspects?
These questions are quite logical and need no further comment.
4.2 The Finance Professor: Use of Statistics and Event Study Methodology
The finance professor used a statistical methodology to determine whether the
developments were so abnormal that this should have alerted the issuer. He
conducted an event study, which is a common methodology in finance to study
whether a certain event had an impact on the stock price (see Sect. 4.5 infra). The
question is whether the observed pattern in price or volume is significant from a
statistical perspective. The answer can be found by comparing the observed pattern
with what was to be expected using a historical comparison period.
The expert used two control periods, of 120 and 250 days, immediately
preceding the relevant period (Question 4 above). According to the expert, 120 days
16 See Hof Amsterdam 16 April 2013, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2013:2660.
17 Specifically, the court asked for the experts’ opinion on the factors mentioned by issuer Super de Boer,
namely: (a) whether the higher volumes on 9 and 10 September were the result of so-called block trades
(see Sect. 5 infra); (b) there were no particular market rumours about a takeover of Super de Boer,
whereas there was speculation in the market about consolidations in the branch of trade concerned and
about a possible takeover of Super de Boer; (c) the fluctuations in the share in the relevant period did not
show a typical picture of a leakage; (d) the increased activity in the share followed the general positive
market sentiment of the AScX and AMX indexes; and (e) the possibility of speculation about the
publication of quarterly results on 15 September 2009.
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is a commonly used period for estimates based on daily data. The 250-day period
was used to make clear how much the analysis depends on the underlying
assumptions. With both control periods it was shown that the developments were
statistically abnormal at the 1% significance level.
Statistical significance here means that it can be concluded with a certain
probability that the observed developments fit the developments that one would
expect based on the historical control period. According to the expert, in the VEB/
SdB case there was only a 1% probability that the developments in volumes and
prices fitted the developments in the control period. This is quite a firm conclusion
from a statistical perspective. The development of volumes was abnormal from 7
September 2009 onwards, and on 11 September 2009 both prices and volumes
showed abnormal patterns. This was before 18 September, when a press release with
the price-sensitive information was issued by Super de Boer. According to the
expert, the most likely explanation for the statistically abnormal patterns is that new
information—either public of private—reached the market and influenced prices
and volumes. The expert was unable to attribute the developments to new public
information based on case documents and databases. Regarding the Court’s fifth
question, the expert states that developments in prices are more important than
developments in volumes, because prices ‘are informative about the interpretation
of volumes’. In his view, the issuer could have observed significant developments as
of 7 September 2009, and should have acknowledged unexplainable developments
that were significant on 11 September.
Regarding the Court of Appeal’s third question, the expert observes that it is
impossible to describe a typical leakage, because the consequences depend on the
information’s importance, the transactions that are being conducted, and other
investors’ reactions. It is possible that the magnitude of transactions is so small that
it will not show up in the analysis, or that the effect is amplified by other investors’
reactions. Either way, the expert concludes that the patterns in the VEB/SdB case are
consistent with an information leakage.
An advantage of the statistical methodology used by the finance professor is that
it can be implemented relatively quickly and easily by issuers’ compliance
departments. If a statistical analysis shows abnormal price and volume patterns in a
period when disclosure of price-sensitive information is being delayed, this is a
reasonably clear signal for the issuer that further delay is no longer possible, unless
there are good alternative explanations for the abnormal developments.
4.3 The Investment Analyst: Use of Technical Analysis and Charting
The other expert used the method of technical analysis. This is a security
analysis methodology for forecasting the direction of prices through the study of
past market data, primarily price and volume. The efficacy of technical analysis is
contested by advocates of the efficient-market hypothesis18 which states that stock
18 For an explanation, underlying assumptions and criticism, see Fama (1970), Fama (1991) and Shleifer
(2000).
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market prices are essentially unpredictable because past information is already
reflected in market prices.
In the VEB/SdB case, the investment analyst depicted the development of prices
and volumes from the beginning of 2009, i.e., 9 months before the relevant period.
He observed that ‘volume precedes price’ and concludes that in the 9-month period,
the increase in volume was significant when the volume in September was ‘much
higher’ than the daily mean of 64,000 trades. The significant jump in volume on 9
September was a strong signal for the market, and the issuer should have recognised
this. On 11 September, the price jumps, from € 2.86 to € 3.00, which is the final
‘buying signal’ for the analyst. Although the expert is not very clear on this point, he
seems to argue that the issuer should have disclosed the price-sensitive information
on 9 September.
In my opinion, the method of technical analysis and charting is not particularly
suited to determine whether price-sensitive information was timely disclosed. What
is problematic is the lack of agreement among technical analysts about the
implementation of the methodology. The identification of ‘trends’ and interpretation
of charts seems quite subjective. For example, the expert report in the VEB/SdB case
does not thoroughly substantiate the choices of methodology. Arguably, a somewhat
more objective methodology could more easily be implemented by issuers and leads
to less legal uncertainty.
4.4 The Court’s Approach
In its final judgment, the Court of Appeal adopts the conclusions of the experts that
there had been abnormal developments. However, this masks that the experts used a
very different methodology and identified a different date on which the issuer
should have recognised the abnormality of the developments. Remarkably, the
Court of Appeal marks a different moment than at least one of the experts, namely
the end of 9 September (or, at the latest, 10 September, before trading started) as the
relevant moment for the issuer to disclose the price-sensitive information. The
finance professor argued for 11 September as the relevant moment, the investment
analyst for 9 September, whereas the District Court chose the end of 10 September.
How does the Court of Appeal arrive at its identification of the end of 9
September as the moment to disclose the price-sensitive information? On 9
September, a ‘multitude’ of shares of nine times the daily mean of the previous
period (the court implicitly uses a 9-month historical period) was traded, and on the
two previous days, volumes had also been ‘considerably higher’. Therefore, it was
clear to the Court that the development differed significantly from usual patterns,
which should have been acknowledged by the issuer. As we will see below, the
Court did not see any plausible alternative explanations. It adds that the lack of a
price increase at (the end of) 9 September does not undermine its conclusion,
because trading on the basis of private information does not necessarily lead to a
price increase.
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4.5 Analysis and Assessment
For issuers and for the value of the precedent it is unsatisfactory that the District
Court, the Court of Appeal, and the experts chose different moments for the duty to
disclose price-sensitive information. I will focus here on the reasoning of the Court
of Appeal, which can be followed but is not very precise. For example, what
‘multitude’ of average daily trading volumes leads to the qualification of
abnormality? A nine times higher trading volume on 9 September appears to be a
clear enough signal for the Court, whereas a twice or thrice as high volume in the
preceding days is probably not enough. Arguably, the statistical approach of the
finance professor is more precise. It results in less legal uncertainty than the Court’s
loose reasoning, and the statistical methodology is also easier to implement for
issuers. Therefore, it seems preferable to use the concept of statistical significance
rather than the Court’s approach. Although the use of statistics does not lead to
hard-and-fast rules, it can throw up fairly clear red flags. Let us now focus on event
studies in more detail.
4.5.1 Event Studies, Statistical Significance and the Likelihood of Loss
of Confidentiality
To analyse the role that event studies play in the choices faced by the Court, first
some preliminary remarks will be made. The event study is a common tool in (US)
securities fraud litigation to detect the impact of fraud on securities prices.19 In an
event study, the observed movements in price and/or volume in the period of
investigation are compared with historical patterns of price and volume movements
in a control period. As a first step, a model is estimated on the basis of the historical
control period to calculate the movements in price and volume that would be
expected in the period under investigation. Subsequently, the actually observed
movements in the period under investigation can be compared with what was
expected. In event studies it is usually assumed that the differences between the
observed and the predicted changes are distributed according to a normal bell-
shaped probability distribution function with a mean of zero. In that case, the
differences (the ‘abnormal return’) would be close to zero in most cases. Only if the
observation passes a critical value or cut-off point—a certain number of standard
deviations from the mean—will it be concluded that the result is statistically
significant, i.e., the null hypothesis of the observations fitting into a normal pattern
is rejected. It is customary to use critical values so that statistical significance is
assumed if the observed difference occurs only in 5% of the cases (5% significance
level), although other percentages such as 10, 2.5 and 1% are also used in research
practice.20 Note that, to be significant at the 2.5 or 1% level, the observed difference
has to be further away from the mean than if a 5% significance level is used, because
19 For general concerns and problems regarding the use of event studies, see, among others, Bhagat and
Romano (2002), Fisch (2013, 2015) and Brav and Heaton (2015). For the historical development of the
use of event studies, see Craig MacKinlay (1997).
20 Brav and Heaton (2015), at p. 11.
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the critical value is further away from the mean. In that sense, the 2.5 and 1% tests
are stricter than the 5% test and there is more certainty that the observed pattern
indeed does not fit into a normal pattern. The opposite is true if a 10% significance
level is used.
For the purposes of this paper, the null hypothesis tested is that there is no loss of
confidentiality of price-sensitive information based on the observed movements in
prices and volumes. According to the statistical test, we would reject this null
hypothesis if the differences between the observed movements and the predicted
movements occurred in less than 5% (or another percentage) of the cases where the
null hypothesis is true. In the VEB/SdB case, there was statistical significance at the
5% and even at the 1% level. However, it is still possible that, in reality, no price-
sensitive information was leaked and it is just coincidence that such a strange
pattern is observed. This is a type I error (‘false positive’): the observed pattern is
statistically qualified as abnormal (leakage of information), whereas in reality it is
normal (no leakage of information).21 Nevertheless, in case of statistical signifi-
cance at the 5, 2.5 or 1% level, the probability of a type I error is low.
We saw that the Court of Appeal argued that the duty to disclose price-sensitive
information can be re-activated if there is a clear signal that confidentiality is no
longer maintained. Statistical significance of the observed movements at the 1 and
2.5% levels can be claimed to constitute such a clear signal. It could be argued that
statistical significance at the less strict 5% or even 10% level also constitutes a
sufficiently clear signal. However, it should be remembered that it is difficult for
issuers to interpret (volatile) stock price and volume movements, and they can have
a legitimate interest in delaying disclosure of the price-sensitive information. Courts
would be wise to look carefully at the statistical model’s assumptions and
specifications, as well as the other evidence, before imposing liability on the issuer
(especially when based on the 10% significance level) for delaying the disclosure of
price-sensitive information. There is a great deal of flexibility in how event studies
are constructed.22
What can be concluded if the observed pattern does not pass the statistical test?
In that case, from a statistical point of view, the null hypothesis of a normal
development (no leakage) cannot be rejected. However, in reality, the development
could be abnormal (there was a leakage). This would be a so-called type II error
(‘false negative’).23 It is important to understand that the absence of statistical
significance does not mean that it is more likely than not that confidentiality was
maintained.24 Stated differently, the null hypothesis of maintained confidentiality is
not necessarily the most likely if no statistical significance can be shown. Hence,
lack of statistical significance should not automatically shield the issuer from a duty
21 See, more generally, ibid.; Fox et al. (2015), at p. 29.
22 Fox (2015).
23 Brav and Heaton (2015), at p. 11; Fox et al. (2015), at p. 29.
24 See Brav and Heaton (2015), at p. 11, who assert that the use of likelihood ratios may have a better
connection to evidentiary burdens than simple reliance on type I errors. A likelihood ratio is a statistical
term that refers to the strength of information supporting one hypothesis over another. A likelihood ratio
test then associates liability with evidence strength exceeding a posited threshold. See Kaplow (2014),
who also writes about the relationship with the more familiar Bayesian posterior probabilities analysis.
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to disclose (and from liability if it fails to do so). All available evidence should be
considered. It should be noted that event studies are most suited to detect a breach of
confidentiality that has a relatively large impact on prices or volumes. Generally, the
stricter (i.e., lower) the required significance level, the lower the rate of type I errors,
but the higher the rate of type II errors. There is a tradeoff here.
4.5.2 Event Studies and Volatility
A problem with the event study methodology is that the more volatile the trading
patterns of a listed company, the less powerful the event study test.25 Statistical
power means the probability that a test will correctly identify a genuine effect (in
this case a loss of confidentiality), i.e., it is the probability that the test will reject a
false null hypothesis.26 This probability is inversely related to the probability of
making a type II error (assuming no loss of confidentiality whereas in fact there is a
loss of confidentiality).27 In turn, the type II error rate depends not only on the
significance level, but also on the magnitude of the actual effect of the loss of
confidentiality and the standard deviation.28 The larger the actual effect relative to
the standard deviation, the greater the odds of passing the statistical test.29
Conversely, a larger standard deviation reduces the odds of passing the test.30 It
becomes more difficult to identify truly anomalous patterns. If a statistical event
study test were leading for the courts to assume liability towards investors, firms
with high stock price volatility would escape liability more often than firms with
low stock price volatility. Therefore, it should be reiterated that statistics do not lead
to hard-and-fast rules, but can throw up red flags. As always, the courts should
consider all relevant circumstances and available evidence.
4.5.3 The Length of the Historical Control Period
An interesting issue is the required length of the historical control period. According
to the issuer in VEB/SdB, a long comparison period should be used, whereas the
investor association argued that a much shorter period would be preferable (hence
an abnormal development was easier to demonstrate). The Court of Appeal
implicitly adopts the 9-month period which was used by the technical analyst.
However, it does not clearly motivate this choice, which is different from the
control period of 4 and 8 months used by the finance professor. This is
unsatisfactory. In my opinion, the finance professor’s method is to be preferred.
25 Fox (2015); Fox et al. (2015).
26 Brav and Heaton (2015), at p. 11, referring to Ellis (2010).
27 Ibid.
28 Fox et al. (2015), at p. 30.
29 Ibid., at p. 32.
30 A special case is analysed by Fox et al. (2015), where an economic crisis leads to volatility spikes.
They show that conventional event study methodology can underestimate the extent of type I errors,
because the standard deviation is underestimated. With more advanced econometric techniques, it is
possible to correct for this flaw. The type II error rate can also rise at a time when volatility increases due
to an economic crisis.
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By using different time windows, it becomes clear how much the results of the
analysis depend on the underlying assumptions. Time windows can also demon-
strate the influence of recent or less recent volatility (see above). Courts should take
this into account in their decisions. In academic literature, control periods of
100–300 days are considered normal for conducting event studies.31
4.5.4 How to Act upon Discovery of a Statistically Significant Deviation in Trading
Patterns
How should the issuer act when a statistically significant deviation in trading
patterns is discovered? Should it disclose the price-sensitive information immedi-
ately, or should the deviation in trading patterns continue for a certain period of time
before action will be required (and if so, for how long)? The Court of Appeal’s
decision is not very clear on this issue but does mention 3 days of subsequent
anomalous patterns, the third day being considerably more significant than the days
before. Under the MAR, the issuer should disclose as soon as possible if
confidentiality is no longer ensured,32 and the issuer should document the reasons
for delaying disclosure so as to be able to provide a written explanation to the
supervisory authority.33 The tricky part is determining when the issuer should
conclude that confidentiality is no longer maintained. Considering the difficulty of
interpreting volatile stock price and volume movements and issuers’ legitimate
interest in delaying the price-sensitive information, it could be argued that some
time should be given to issuers to investigate the anomalies and the possibility of
alternative explanations. It is difficult to say categorically how much time should be
available to issuers, but it would seem hard to justify a further delay of disclosure
after 2 days of statistically significant deviations without there being convincing
alternative explanations. The magnitude of the deviation could also be relevant here:
the larger the deviation, the sooner a press release will be necessary.
4.5.5 Volumes or Prices?
Finally, it is somewhat remarkable that the Court bases its decision on the abnormal
development of volumes, without there being an abnormal price development (yet).
Both experts state that price movements are more important than volumes, because
prices ‘are informative about the interpretation of volumes’ (finance professor) and
volumes and prices need to be analysed in conjunction (technical analyst). However,
the Court seems to be right in stating that trading on the basis of private information
31 Fox (2015) mentions a 1-year control period. Mitchel and Netter (1994) refer to a period of 100 to 300
trading days.
32 Art. 17(7) MAR.
33 Art. 17(4) MAR.
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does not necessarily lead to a price increase,34 although price increases make a more
convincing case of a leakage.
5 Alternative Explanations for Anomalous Patterns
In the VEB/SdB case it was held that delaying disclosure of price-sensitive
information is no longer justified if significant abnormal developments are observed
that do not have an alternative (convincing) explanation. What kind of alternative
explanations are conceivable?
In VEB/SdB, both experts argued that there was no convincing alternative
explanation, even though the issuer fiercely argued that there was. The finance
professor had consulted the case documents as well as the Lexis-Nexis database for
value relevant news about Super de Boer, but had not been able to find indications
of public news explaining the observed anomalies. He also argued that the
anomalies were too strong to be explained by ‘noise trading’. Noise trading is
trading not based on information and without a specific motivation.35 He stated that
‘liquidity traders’ could account for some of the effects. These liquidity traders do
not trade on the basis of fundamental information, but with a specific motivation,
such as adjusting portfolio weights to track an index. The issuer Super de Boer
argued that so-called block trades were responsible for (part of) the anomalies. In a
block trade, an investor buys or sells a large amount of securities. The issuer argued
that trading on inside information is unlikely in a block trade, but this argument
could not be substantiated with certainty in the procedure. The finance professor
considered it possible that the block trade was based on private (inside) information,
and therefore did not exclude block trades from his analysis. What sparked a debate
after the experts had delivered their reports was the question of whether block trades
could lead to herding behaviour of other investors. The finance professor considered
it unlikely that noise trading could explain the anomalies, but did not elaborate on
this statement. The Court of Appeal subsequently followed the expert, also without
elaborating much.
What is interesting is the extent to which arguments from the school of
‘behavioural economics’ can be invoked by issuers to substantiate alternative
explanations. Behavioural economics acknowledges that investors do not act
perfectly rational, as is traditionally assumed by neoclassical economics. In
experiments, psychologists and behavioural economists have identified many
cognitive biases and heuristics.36 Thus, the argument made by the issuer in VEB/
SdB that the anomalous pattern could be explained by herding behaviour invokes
34 See also Prevoo and Ter Weel (2010) (‘trading on share relevant information might not be seen in
price changes if the information is not public. If an individual possesses information which leads him/her
to believe a certain stock price is going to rise in the near future, and if the information is not known to or
anticipated by the market as a whole, the transaction will not necessarily lead to an increase in the price of
the stock. Insider trading might then only be discovered when examining trade volumes.’).
35 See Shleifer (2000), at p. 28.
36 See, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1973), Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Kahneman (2011). For
an overview, see Rubinstein (2001).
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behavioural economics. Although the Court could dismiss these arguments by
simply referring to the independent expert’s opinion, the question remains to what
extent courts would and should be susceptible to such arguments.
The degree of (empirical) scientific documentation of the modality of non-
rational behaviour that is invoked by the issuer could be relevant for courts. If the
phenomenon has been described in several publications in high-ranking journals, it
will be more credible than if it has only been described in unpublished working
papers. Furthermore, the issuer will have a stronger case if the alternative
explanation is not only theoretically described, but also supported by empirical
evidence. Arguably, non-rational behaviour can sometimes provide an alternative
explanation for abnormal volume or price movements, but this is an exception to the
basic assumption of (fairly) rational and efficient markets. Behavioural economists
have been criticised for coming up with all kinds of new explanations for anomalous
stock market patterns ex post,37 which some would call a mess of special cases.38
Their explanations of the past do not easily generalise to the future, which
complicates making sound practical (legal) policy based on behavioural theories.
Hence, courts should be aware that, in most cases, issuers will be able to provide
some kind of behavioural explanation for anomalous patterns, but that the
credibility and possibility of generalisation of such explanations may vary quite
significantly.
6 The Value of the Precedent and the Relationship Between Private
and Public Law
The VEB/SdB case is based on general Dutch tort law. Under Dutch law, violation of
a statutory duty which results in harm to investors can render the issuer liable
towards them. In Dutch jurisprudence and legal doctrine it is generally accepted that
violation of the statutory duty to timely disclose price-sensitive information (being
an implementation of the MAD 2003) can indeed constitute a tort. In other
European jurisdictions, general tort law or specific statutory rules can also allow
damage claims by investors or investor associations. For example, Germany has
specific statutory rules for such cases,39 and the UK has special (but strict) rules for
liability in cases of fraud and negligence.40 The facts and arguments in the VEB/SdB
case could also be relevant for such jurisdictions, and the case could therefore be an
important precedent in takeover scenarios. Of course, additional conditions may
apply for establishing liability, but the question of when there is a violation of the
37 Levine (2012), quoted in Harford (2014) (‘There is a tendency to propose some new theory to explain
each new fact. The world doesn’t need a thousand different theories to explain a thousand different facts.
At some point there needs to be a discipline of trying to explain many facts with one theory.’). Fama
(1998) argues that many of the findings in behavioural finance appear to contradict each other. Fama also
finds that the jump made by behaviourists from individual irrationality to market irrationality is not
supported by the data.
38 Harford (2014).
39 See § 37b and 37c WpHG.
40 See s 5 of Schedule 10A of the FSMA 2000; Davies and Worthington (2012), para. 26–11.
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duty to timely disclose price-sensitive information is similar across jurisdictions.
Therefore, investors or investor organisations could use arguments from the VEB/
SdB case as a basis for legal proceedings, and courts could find inspiration in the
approach chosen by the Dutch Court of Appeal.
Failure to comply with ad hoc disclosure duties need not only be sanctioned by
way of private law. In fact, the European market abuse regime requires
administrative penalties in case of violation of these duties, while it allows Member
States to also impose criminal sanctions or apply tort law.41 If jurisdictions impose
administrative and/or criminal sanctions, the public prosecutor, the supervisory
authority and judges will have to answer similar questions as the Dutch Court in the
VEB/SdB case, namely whether and when anomalous market developments can
trigger a duty to disclose price-sensitive information (and delaying disclosure is no
longer allowed). Supervisory authorities may have to think about this question at an
early stage, as the new MAR requires that issuers provide a written explanation of
the delay to the supervisory authority (either immediately after disclosure of the
information to the public, or upon request of the supervisory authority).42
As of 3 July 2016, the MAR replaced the MAD of 2003. Consequently, the duty
to disclose price-sensitive information is no longer based on national law
(implementing the Directive) but in principle applies directly as a result of the
Regulation. It is conceivable that national courts will submit preliminary questions
to the European Court of Justice regarding the precise meaning of the condition that
the issuer needs to able to ensure the confidentiality of the information if there are
anomalous market developments. The Dutch courts did not do so and interpreted the
national law (implementing the MAD 2003) themselves. Perhaps the shift from a
Directive to a Regulation will result in a greater tendency among Dutch or other
national courts to submit preliminary questions regarding this matter. If this
happens, the European Court of Justice could find inspiration in the Dutch approach
but of course need not follow it.
In the VEB/SdB case, the lawsuit by investor association VEB was not
accompanied by any administrative or criminal prosecution of the issuer. Although
the issuer pointed out that the absence of administrative measures was a signal that
there was no loss of confidentiality of inside information, the Court of Appeal still
ruled that the duty to disclose had been violated. According to the Court, the issuer
had not been able to give concrete information as to whether the supervisory
authority AFM had actually investigated this case and whether it had indeed decided
not to take measures (and if so, for what reasons). Any viewpoints of the
supervisory authority could therefore not be taken into account.
41 See Art. 30 MAR (and before 3 July 2016 Art. 14 MAD 2003). The new market abuse regime allows
the absence of administrative sanctions if infringements are subject to criminal sanctions.
42 Art. 17(4) MAR.
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7 Conclusion
This article has focused on issuers’ duty to disclose inside information which
directly concerns the issuer as soon as possible, as laid down in the European market
abuse rules. Delaying disclosure is possible under strict conditions, one of them
being that confidentiality of the information is ensured. The question that has been
analysed is whether considerable fluctuations in price or volume of the issuer’s
traded securities can re-activate the duty to disclose, as confidentiality is apparently
no longer ensured. A Dutch case, VEB/SdB, is an important precedent in this
respect: the Court of Appeal ruled that issuer Super de Boer did not timely disclose,
considering the market developments, and this constituted a tort towards investors.
The relevant criterion adopted by the Court for deciding that further delaying
disclosure of price-sensitive information is no longer allowed is that there are
developments in the market that deviate significantly from usual patterns, without
there being an alternative (convincing) explanation. Experts in this case used the
statistical event study methodology and technical analysis to implement this
criterion. Although the Court accepted both methodologies, it has been submitted in
this paper that the statistical methodology is to be preferred to technical analysis, as
the latter methodology is less objective than the former and leads to more legal
uncertainty for issuers. The paper has discussed several legal issues that come up
when a statistical methodology is used to assess the issuer’s liability.
Subsequently, possible alternative explanations for anomalous market patterns
have been discussed. In VEB/SdB, the issuer failed to convince the Court of the
existence of such an alternative explanation. It is especially interesting to see the
extent to which arguments from behavioural economics, such as herding behaviour
among investors, can provide adequate explanations. It has been submitted that
investor irrationality can, under some circumstances, provide an alternative
explanation. However, courts should be somewhat careful in accepting behavioural
arguments. In most cases, issuers will be able to proffer some kind of behavioural
explanation for anomalous patterns, but the credibility and possibility of general-
isation of such explanations may vary quite significantly.
Finally, it has been submitted that the VEB/SdB case is relevant for all European
jurisdictions that allow damage claims by investors for untimely disclosure of price-
sensitive information, as similar questions need to be answered. The same is true for
administrative or criminal procedures. An important lesson from the Netherlands is
that issuers would be wise to carefully monitor the development of prices and
volumes when delaying disclosure of price-sensitive information, as failure to do so
can result in civil liability or penalties.
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